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PUBLIC ACCESS SHORELINE HAWAII v.
HAWAI'I CO UNTY PLANNING COMMISSION:
EXPANDING HAWAII'S DOCTRINE OF CUSTOM
Laura C. Harris
I. INTRoDUCTION
Rapid development of coastline areas in Hawaii has sparked the
attention of several native Hawaiian public interest groups. The growth
of large resort hotels and condominiums along the beaches is eliminating
areas once open for the exercise of traditional gathering practices.
Tensions have risen between those interested in promoting the develop-
ment of the land and those interested in preserving the traditional Hawai-
ian culture. In recent years, disputes have resulted in court challenges to
state regulations permitting development on coastal properties.
In Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai 'i County Planning
Commission,' the Supreme Court of Hawaii unanimously upheld a lower
court's decision that allowed an organization representing native Hawaiian
interests to challenge the issuance of a Special Management Area (SMA)
use permit. The court ruled that Public Access Shoreline Hawaii (PASH)
had standing to participate in contested case hearings before the planning
commission in order to challenge a proposed resort development.' The
court further stated that under the Hawaii Constitution, a state agency has
an obligation to "preserve and protect" traditional and customary Hawaiian
rights and an affirmative duty to consider potentially adverse effects on
those rights when issuing SMA permits.' Essentially, the court recognized
that, with respect to developing lands, the developer's private property
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1999.
1. 903 P.2d 1246 (Haw. 1995), cert. denied, Nansay Haw., Inc. v. Public Access
Shoreline Haw., 116 S. Ct. 1559 (1996).
2. Id at 1250.
3. Id at 1273.
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interest4 is subject to superior rights established by customary and tradi-
tional native Hawaiian gathering practices.
The extent to which Hawaii has used and expanded the doctrine of
custom to support traditional native Hawaiian practices and the public's
access to coastal lands and waters is the subject of this Note. Part H
provides a look at the legal background encompassing the doctrine of
custom and Hawaii's recognition of customary practices. The court's
decision in the PASH case is analyzed in Part III. Part IV discusses the
consequences of the court's decision and how the decision supports public
interest goals.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Custom
The doctrine of custom imposes a servitude on otherwise private
property, often allowing public access over private property, such as
coastal lands, or preventing the landowner from exercising certain uses of
the land.' It can be traced to early English law, where it was applied
broadly to claims of land and water rights.6 Historically, the doctrine was
limited to individual pieces of land within a local community7 and pro-
vided that after many years of unrestricted common usage, the public
acquired legal access rights over such property.8 Discussions of the
common law recognition of customary servitudes and the basic elements
establishing a claim of custom often cite William Blackstone's Commen-
taries on the Law of England,9 which suggest that the use be: (1) exercised
4. Id. at 1268, 1270-7 1.
5. For a detailed discussion of the doctrine of custom, see Hope M. Babcock, Has the
U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings Jurisprudence?: The Impact
of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 30-35 (1995).
6. Id. at31.
7. Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the Ancient Regime: Custom, Utility, and
the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 184 (1993). See also
David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1375 (1996).
8. State ex rel. Haman v. E.R.W. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1101 (Idaho 1979) (quoting Post
v. Pearsall, 22 Wend. 425 (N.Y.Ct.Err. 1839)).
9. Bederman, supra note 7, at 1382 (discussing Blackstone's Commentaries and its use
in American law).
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so long "that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary;" (2) without
interruption; (3) peaceable and free from dispute; (4) reasonable; (5)
certain; (6) obligatory once established; and (7) consistent with other
customs. 10
In the United States, the doctrine has been recognized in a few
states, 1 almost exclusively for public access to beaches. 2 Courts must
determine whether to preserve the asserted custom by "balancing the
respective interests and harm"'3 and consider that "permitting access to
private property... may indeed conflict with the exclusivity traditionally
associated with fee simple ownership of land." 4
More than one state has found that customary rights are consistent
with the underlying property law of that state. In Stevens v. City of
Cannon Beach, 5 the Oregon Supreme Court utilized the doctrine to
prevent landowners from excluding the public from dry sand areas of the
ocean shore. 6 A 1979 Idaho case 7 also applied the doctrine of custom in
a claim to establish public rights to privately-owned waterfront property.
The court stated affirmatively that "[t]here being no statute which ex-
10. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d
1246, 1262 n.26 (Haw. 1995) (quoting I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 76-78
(Sharwood ed. 1874)).
11. The doctrine of custom has specifically been recognized in Oregon, Idaho, Texas,
and Hawaii. Bederman, supra note 7, at 1380 n.16. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993); State ex reL Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093 (Idaho 1979);
Arrington v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. App. 1989); Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656
P.2d 745 (Haw. 1982).
12. Another theory used for maintaining access to coastal lands and waters is the Public
Trust Doctrine. This doctrine is founded in the principle that by its nature and characteris-
tics of its uses, some lands are regulated by the government in the public trust. Bederman,
supra note 7, at 1455 n.8. Most commonly, the doctrine provides that "lands are preserved
for public use in navigation, fishing and recreation and state, as trustee for the people, bears
the responsibility of preserving and protecting the right of the public to the use of the waters
for those purposes." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1232 (6th ed. 1990). It is important to note
that the designated public beach area is most often defined as the mean high tide line, as
defined by the Supreme Court in 1935. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d at 454-
55 n.12.
13. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d at
1261.
14. Id at 1259 (quoting Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d at 748).
15. 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denie4 114 S. Ct. 1332 (1994).
16. Id at 456.
17. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093 (Idaho 1979). The doctrine of custom
is valid in Idaho, yet not met under the facts of this case.
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pressly or impliedly rejects the doctrine of custom .... the doctrine does
obtain in Idaho."'I
B. Hawaii's Recognition of Customary Rights
Hawaii is generally known as a state rich in culture and native
heritage. While some protection for traditional activities can be found in
the Hawaii Constitution and statutes, the courts have also utilized the
doctrine of custom to recognize protected rights in these long-standing
practices. "
Although not directly addressed in its early decisions, the Hawaii
Supreme Court has generally recognized the traditional native Hawaiian
practice of gathering items from the land.2" The court has also recognized
uses of custom to define the location of seaward property boundaries,2"
and to grant access to Hawaiian trails.2"
In 1982, faced with a challenge to traditional gathering rights on
undeveloped private property, the court addressed for the first time the
gathering rights23 of persons within traditional land divisions, called an
ahupua'a.24 In Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co.' the court analyzed three
18. Id.atll0l.
19. Bederman, supra note 7, at 1426-27.
20. In the 1879 case In re Boundaries ofPulehunui, 4 Haw. 239 (Haw. 1879), the court
stated:
[A] principle very largely obtaining in these divisions of territory [ahupua'a] was that
a land should run from the sea to the mountains, thus affording to the chief and his
people a fishery residence at the warm seaside, together with the products of the high
lands, such as fuel, canoe timber, mountain birds, and the right of way to the same,
and all the varied products of the intermediate land as might be suitable to the soil and
climate of the different altitudes from sea soil to mountainside or top.
Id. at 241, cited in Paul Lucas, Gathering Rights, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK
223, 225 (Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed., 1991).
21. In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968) (recognizing that Hawaii's land laws are
unique in that they are based on ancient tradition, custom, practice, and usage, and finding
that the boundary between private land and public beaches is delineated by the edge of
vegetation).
22. See Lucas, supra note 20, at 216 (citing Barba v. Okuna, No. 8160 mem. (Dec. 3,
1982) (a right established by custom does exist for use of Hawaiian trails)).
23. The court stated, "[w]hile the extent and scope of the latter set of rights [water]
have been the subject of discussion by this court.., we are unable to find any previous
interpretation of the gathering rights found in the statute. The issue we address is thus one
of first impression." Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 748 (Haw. 1982).
24. An ahupua'a is defined by the court as "a land division usually extending from the
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sources of law recognizing gathering rights. The first source, Hawaii
Revised Statutes section 7-1, is an 1851 statute that specifically enumer-
ates certain items which can be gathered within an ahupua'a.26 The court
concluded that native Hawaiian gathering rights could be asserted under
section 7-1 under three conditions: (1) the individual must reside within
the ahupua'a where the rights are to be claimed; (2) the rights can only be
exercised on undeveloped lands; and (3) the rights are exercised for the
purpose of practicing native Hawaiian customs and traditions.27
The second source for gathering rights protections is Hawaii Revised
Statutes Section 1-1, also termed the Hawaiian usage exception.2  This
statute accepted the common law of England, including notions of private
property rights, as of the time the Statute was adopted in 1892. However,
the statute specifically reserved an exception for any Hawaiian custom
practiced before that date.29 The Kalipi court interpreted this exception
as allowing for "native understanding and practices which did not unrea-
mountains to the sea along rational lines, such as ridges or other natural characteristics."
Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1250
n.1 (Haw. 1995).
25. 656 P.2d 745, 748 (Haw. 1982).
26. HAw. Rnv. STAT. § 7-1 (1993) provides:
[W]here the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter obtain, allodial titles to their
lands, the people on each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to take fire-
wood, housetimber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for
their own private use, but they shall not have a right to take such articles to sell for
profit. The people shall also have a right to drinking water, and running water... and
roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple; provided that this shall
not be applicable to wells and water-courses, which individuals have made for their
own use.
lad
27. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d at 749.
28. Id. at 750. HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 provides:
The common law of England, as ascertained by English and American decisions, is
declared to be the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise
expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or by the laws of
the State, or fixed by Hawaiianjudicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage
Id (emphasis added).
29. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d at
1268. "Accordingly, § 1-1 represents the codification of the doctrine of custom as it applies
in our state... [and] fixed November 25, 1892 as the date Hawaiian usage must have been
established in practice." Id See also Bederman, supra note 7, at 1427.
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sonably interfere with the spirit of the common law,"3" including the
practice of gathering.
The third basis for gathering rights is the 1978 amendment to the
Hawaii Constitution, which protects customary rights exercised for
subsistence, cultural, and religious purposes for descendants of native
Hawaiians. 3
After the Kalipi court found a constitutional and statutory basis for
granting native Hawaiians access over private property to practice tradi-
tional rights within their ahupua'a, in 1992, the court expanded this right
in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty.3" The Pele court found that "native
Hawaiian rights protected by article XII, section 7 may extend beyond the
ahupua'a in which a native Hawaiian resides where such rights have been
customarily and traditionally exercised."33 The court reasoned that the
language of the Constitutional amendment lends protection beyond the
specific gatherings rights enumerated in the statute.34 The court distin-
guished the Kalipi court's requirement that the customary practice was
limited to within the ahupua'a by stating that the Pele members asserted
rights based on traditional access and gathering patterns, not on land
ownership, the argument of Kalipi.35 Thus, by removing the residency
requirement, Pele departed from previous customary law as applied in
Hawaii.
30. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d at 750.
31. HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 7 (1978) provides:
The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised
for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants
who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior
to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights.
Id.
32. 837 P.2d 1247 (Haw. 1992).
33. Id. at 1272.
34. Gina M. Watumull, Comment, Pele Defense Fund v. Paty: Exacerbating the
Inherent Conflict Between Hawaiian Native Tenant Access and Gathering Rights and
Western Property Rights, 16 U. HAw. L. REv. 207, 244 (1994).
35. Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d at 1271.
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Hm. PUBLIC ACCESS SHORELINE HAWAI'I V.
HAWAI'I COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
A. The Lower Court Denies Standing
Nansay Hawaii, Inc. applied to the Hawai'i County Planning Com-
mission (HPC) for a SMA use permit to build a resort on a 450-acre
shoreline area located within the designation of an ahupua'a. Several
anchialine ponds,36 significant to native Hawaiians exercising traditional
practices of gathering rights, were located within the proposed develop-
ment site." In accordance with agency rules, a public hearing was held
on the permit application where the organization PASH and an individual,
Pilago, presented testimony and requested contested case hearings on the
development permit. The HPC denied the requests on the ground that
their interests were "not clearly distinguishable from that of the general
public"3" and therefore did not have standing to participate in a contested
case. The HPC subsequently granted the SMA use permit to Nansay. 9
PASH and Pilago challenged the agency's decision to deny the
contested case request and to grant the SMA use permit. After the trial
court found that both PASH and Pilago had standing,40 an intermediate
court of appeals ruled only PASH was entitled to participate in a contested
36. The court described anchialine ponds as follows:
Anchialine ponds are defined by the court as shoreline pools without surface
connection to the sea having waters of measurable salinity and showing tidal rhythms.
The ponds are commonly located in recent lava flows which had depressions deep
enough to reach the water table. The ponds consist of brackish water with a
crustacean-mollusk dominated faunal community along with several species of shrimp
and a variety of vegetation types.
Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 900 P.2d 1313, 1316
n.3 (Haw. 1993).
37. The significance of Hawaiian gathering rights centers around the historical
designation of the ahupua'a. The original purpose of gathering activities was for
subsistence, medicinal, or religious uses. The division of the land provided for a variety of
items to be available from the land and the sea. As the land began to be developed, private
property concepts demanded limitations on the exercise of gathering rights. See Lucas,
supra note 20, at 223-26.
38. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d at
1246, 1250 (Haw. 1995).
39. Id at 1250-51.
40. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 853 P.2d 542
(Haw. 1993).
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case hearing.4 The court further stated that the HPC "disregarded the
rules regarding the gathering rights of native Hawaiians and its obligation
to preserve and protect those rights."42 Nansay and the HPC appealed,
which set the stage for the Hawaiian Supreme Court to decide both the
standing and the gathering rights issues.43
B. The Parties' Arguments and the Court's Decision
Nansay and the HPC made several arguments against granting PASH
standing to participate in a contested case hearing. First, they argued that
there is no obligation for the HPC to consider or require protection of
traditional and customary Hawaiian rights in granting a SMA use permit."
They also contended that if such an obligation exists, by requiring Nansay
to establish a program for preserving and maintaining the anchialine ponds
on the development site, the HPC had fulfilled that obligation.45
Second, they argued that PASH failed to establish a prima facie claim
of native Hawaiian gathering rights. They argued that Hawaii law
requires that the customary use be one of the traditional gathering rights
enumerated in section 7-1 of the statute, established as of 1892, and that
the evidence presented only shows shrimp gathering at the ponds as of the
late 1920s. 46 Finally, Nansay argued that limiting development of the
property would "fundamentally alter its property rights," amounting to an
unconstitutional taking.47
The Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the decision granting standing to
PASH to participate in a contested case hearing. The court focused on the
preservation of customary rights as established in Hawaii law, ruling them
consistent with the doctrine of custom. Finding support in Kalipi and
41. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 900 P.2d
1313, 1322 (Haw. 1993). Regarding Pilago, the court explained that his interest was not
sufficiently "personal" to distinguish it from that of the general public. Id at 1321.
42. Id. at 1320.
43. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 853 P.2d at
542. Pilago did not appeal the decision. The question for the Hawaii Supreme Court was
limited to PASH's standing. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning
Comm'n, 903 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Haw. 1995).
44. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d at
1251.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1272.
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Pele, the court further imposed an obligation to "preserve and protect"
native Hawaiian fights to the extent reasonable when issuing a SMA use.
permit.48
The court reasoned that the Hawaiian usage exception was compara-
ble to the common law doctrine of custom.4 9 The PASH court agreed with
the Kalipi court that "all the requisite elements of the doctrine of custom
were [not] necessarily incorporated" into Hawaii law5° and proceeded to
suggest its own requirements for establishing these rights through custom.
First, the court confirmed the Pele decision that "rights normally associ-
ated with tenancy in an ahupua'a may also apply to the exercise of rights
beyond the physical boundaries of that particular ahupua'a."1 Second, the
court found that the term "native Hawaiian" was not a limiting factor, and
that protection of these rights is not determined by a specific blood
quantum2 but extends to "descendants of native Hawaiians... who assert
otherwise valid customary and traditional" rights.53 The court also com-
mented on the "continuous" element of customary practice and held that
"the right . . . to exercise traditional and customary practices remains
intact, notwithstanding arguable abandonment of a particular site."'54
Finally, the court suggested that while these rights "will not necessarily
prevent landowners from developing their lands," regulations do apply on
48. Id at 1273. The court found that "the neighbor island county planning commissions
... are specifically required to give full consideration ... to... cultural... [and] historic
... values as well as to the needs for economic development when implementing the
objectives, policies, and SMA guidelines set forth in the [Coastal Zone Management Act]."
Id at 1256 (emphasis in original). "Accordingly, the HPC may not issue a SMA use permit
unless it finds that the proposed project will not have any significant adverse effects." Id.
at 1257. The court found that one of the CZMA's objectives is to "protect and preserve
those natural and manmade historic and prehistoric resources in the coastal zone
management area that are significant in Hawaiian... history and culture." Id. (emphasis
in original).
49. Id at 1261. "The statutory exception is thus akin to the English doctrine of custom
whereby practices and privileges unique to particular districts continued to apply to the
residents of those districts even though in contravention of the common law." Id. (emphasis
in original).
50. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745,751 (Haw. 1982).
51. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d at
1246, 1269 (Haw. 1995).
52. Id at 1270.
53. Id
54. Id at 1271.
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the "development of land previously undeveloped or not yet fully devel-
oped."55
Noting a conflict between modem understandings of property
ownership and the state's goal of protecting the traditional culture, the
court stated that "issuance of a Hawaiian land patent confirmed a limited
property interest as compared with typical land patents governed by
western concepts of property,"56 and that the "western concept of exclusiv-
ity is not universally applicable in Hawaii."57 Thus, while "unreasonable
or non-traditional uses" would not be permitted 5 8 access to private land
for customary uses is consistent with traditional Hawaiian notions of
private property rights.
Responding to Nansay's argument that granting customary rights
results in an unconstitutional taking of Nansay's property, the court held
that these customs and usage have always been a part of the State's
property law, and therefore, do not constitute a taking.59
IV. THE PASH COURT FAVORS THE DOCTRINE OF CUSTOM OVER
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
In a unanimous decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court took a step
toward preserving the public's access to coastal lands through application
of the doctrine of custom. The court's decision confirmed the public
interest in customary uses of lands and expanded the elements used to
establish such a claim. The court recognized the need for balancing the
interests of public access with the potential harm to property owners, but
provided that the "common law rights ordinarily associated with tenancy
do not limit customary rights" existing under state law.60 The court was
55. Id. "[T]he state is authorized to impose appropriate regulations to govern the
exercise of native Hawaiian rights in conjunction with permits issued for the development
of land previously undeveloped or not yet fully developed." Id. at 1272.
56. Id. at 1268. The court explained earlier that "[g]iven the preservation of Hawaiian
usage in conjunction with the transition to a new system of land tenure, .. . it is doubtful that
• .. recognition of such rights would have 'fundamentally violated the new system.'" Id. at
1267 (quoting Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 751 n.5 (Haw.1982)).
57. Id. at 1268.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1272.
60. Id. at 1269. Although the court declined to overturn Pele, it also did not use a strict
interpretation of "tenants" and limit access only to those residing within the ahupua'a.
Instead, the court interpreted the language of the Hawaii Constitution as general support for
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clear that where customary rights may conflict with "western concepts of
property,"6' the landowners have a limited property interest that does not
include the right to exclude others. 6 2 In these cases, customary rights are
supreme over established property rights.
The court also emphasized an affirmative duty on the part of govern-
ment agencies to determine if native Hawaiian gathering rights have been
customarily and traditionally practiced on the land proposed for develop-
ment and to preserve those rights to the extent feasible. 3 The court was
not precise about what steps the state will be required to talke in investigat-
ing whether these rights could exist. The implication is that any develop-
ment permit could be subject to regulations if overlapping native Hawaiian
interests are found, even if no record of such use exists, or there is no
knowledge of a use at the time the property is purchased.
The court's decision expanded existing Hawaiian law on the extent
that traditional gathering rights can be asserted. The court's decision in
Kalipi specifically limited gathering rights to undeveloped land because
the court reasoned that without this limitation "there would be nothing to
prevent residents from going anywhere in the ahupua'a, including fully
developed property, to gather the enumerated items."6' The PASH
decision opens the door to land "previously undeveloped or not fully
developed."6'
The court also enlarged the potential use of the doctrine by stating that
customary rights may still exist even if the exercise of those rights had
been abandoned.' While traditional English interpretation of establishing
custom requires uninterrupted use, the court found support for its theory
that it is possible to maintain a particular custom even if it is not continu-
the rights of public use and access.
61. at 1268.
62. Id. at 1270. "Customary and traditional rights in these islands flow from native
Hawaiian's pre-existing sovereignty. The rights of their descendants... were not abolished
by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of the United States." Id.
63. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 900 P.2d
1313, 1320 (Haw. 1993).
64. Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 750 (Haw. 1982).
65. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d
1246, 1271-72 (Haw. 1995).
66. Id at 1271.
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ously exercised.67 The court's reasoning is that despite an interrupted use,
the right to exercise the use was never taken away.68
The same rationale is observed in the court's discussion of who can
exercise the customary rights. The court reserved comment on the
question whether non-Hawaiian members of a group could claim the same
protection.69 These theories confirm that the doctrine is premised on the
idea that the right is created with the use in question and not the individual
or the specific parcel of land.
The Hawaii Supreme Court also recognized that the category of
traditional gathering rights established by usage has the potential of being
expanded under Hawaii Revised Statutes section 1-1." The court did not
provide guidelines, leaving for future cases to determine what qualifies as
"unreasonable" or "non-traditional" use. Thus the PASH decision remains
consistent with the court's vision in Kalipi that the scope of traditional and
customary uses is to be decided on the "circumstances of each case."'"
While the court suggested requirements for determining whether
customary rights exist on a particular piece of property, it also noted that
there was a "promising opportunity" for Nansay to integrate cultural
education and recreation with tourism and community living,72 hoping to
find the right balance between the interests of the public and the harm
caused to the property owner.73
V. CONCLUSION
The Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in PASH is a natural extension
of established law and supports the public policy of the public's right to
67. Id. at 1262 n.26 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 76-78 (Sharwood
ed. 1874)).
68. Id. "[T]he custom is not destroyed, though they do not use it for ten years; it only
becomes more difficult to prove." Id See also Bederman, supra note 7, at 1388 (explaining
that Blackstone's interpretation of an interruption significant to destroy an established
custom is not the interruption of the possession, but the interruption of the right).
69. Public Access Shoreline Haw. v. Hawai'i County Planning Comm'n, 903 P.2d at
1270 n.41.
70. Id. at 1272.
71. Id. at 1259 (citing Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 837 P.2d 1247,1271 (Haw. 1992)
(quoting Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 656 P.2d 745, 752 (Haw. 1982)).
72. Id. at 1268.
73. This opportunity will probably never be realized as Nansay withdrew its permit
application on August 1, 1996. Andrew Gomes, Pacific Business News, July 29, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 10525631.
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access coastal lands and waters. While the facts of this case support
extending access to the land and water based on native Hawaiian gathering
rights and the exercise of other traditional practices, the purpose underly-
ing the decision is that the doctrine of custom provides a means for
preserving public access to private lands. The court does not attempt to
discourage private development, only to prevent development from
destroying lands and waters whose preservation is in the public interest
and closely tied to customary uses.
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